A Summary of Quine’s Problems with Carnap’s Philosophy Essay

In his Two Dogmas of Empiricism, Quine addresses what he views as problematic claims made by Carnap. The first problem Quine has with Carnaps epistemology is ab let out his exposition of state-descriptions. The problem is in two parts first Quine says that Carnaps version of uninflectedity is conditional, because it requires atomic sentences in a vocabulary to be mutually independent. The second part of the problem is that, Carnaps attempt to explore analyticity by way of his state-descriptions results in a problematic definition of analyticity, which ends up being more indicative of logical truth.In conclusion, Quine presents a solution to his problems with Carnap positing that the boundary in the midst of synthetic and analytic is imagined. In his attempt to pin down analyticity Quine encounters a problematic attempt at defining the term, by Carnap. Carnap has tended to explain analyticity by appeal to what he calls state-descriptions(195). Carnaps state-descriptions ar probl ematic for two reasons hotshot reason is that a statement is explained as analytic when it comes out true under every state description(195), this necessitates every atomic sentence to be mutually independent- meaning that two statements that mean the same thing are supposed to exist as two completely separate meanings. However, as Quine points out this would mean there would be a state-description which assigned truth to John is a bachelor and falsity to John is married, and consequently All bachelors are married would turn out synthetic rather than analytic under the proposed criterion(195).This truth gives rise to the second problem of Carnaps state-descriptions, that analyticity as it refers to state-descriptions entirely works for languages that do not contain synonymous words such as bachelor and unmarried. So, Quine submits that Carnaps state-descriptions are indicative of logical truth, not of analyticity. To generalize, these problems that Quine has with Carnaps philosoph ical system equate to a single point of disagreement, that there is an absolute distinction between analytic and synthetic.Quine points to our pragmatic inclinations to adjust one establish of the fabric of science rather an another in accommodating some particular recalcitrant experience(207). Quine believes that Carnaps drawing a distinction between analytic and synthetic points to our quest for simplicity in science, possibly deriving from a deconstructionist belief that everything can be equated to simplified smaller elements that profess up a whole.Quine challenges Carnaps methodology as well as his philosophical system. To conclude, Quine notes that he understands the philosophical approach attempted by philosophers like Lewis, and Carnap, entirely does not think that it is a beneficial one. Total science, mathematical and natural and human, is similarly but more extremely underdetermined by experience. The edge of the system must be kept squared with experience(207).Carna ps constructed language is a scientific one, and since science is based on our experience, when Carnap attempts to encompass our world using his language with strict rules, he does an injustice to sciences close relationship to experience, making his language based on the rules of arithmetic instead. Finally, Quine points to Carnaps employment of naturalism as one that comes up short, and does not justify the strict division between synthetic and analytic. Their pragmatism leaves off at the imagined boundary between the analytic and the synthetic.In repudiating such a boundary I espouse a more thorough pragmatism(207). Quine feels that the division between synthetic and analytic has been besides hastily assumed, and that a more thorough approach to the relationship would be helpful. He believes that the boundary between analytic and synthetic is too harshly drawn, and that the digression is only in degrees. He asks Carnap to suppress his foundations in our traditional scientific method and suggests that sometimes it is not always pragmatism that shapes our perception.